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Oneofthemanyproblemsfacingthecountriesintransitionfromsocialismtocapitalism
aftertheinitialphaseofprivatizationandrestructuringisthelackofprovenentrepreneurial
talent in addition to a low initial level of capital. New entrepreneurs might ﬁnd it hard to
ﬁnance their start-up enterprises. This paper therefore argues that a ﬁnancial collapse and
thus a collapse of the new entrepreneurial sector might occur. First, the lack of ﬁnancial
intermediation in transition economies is examined empirically before proceeding to a
theoretical model. Using IMF data on claims to the private sector, we ﬁnd that the ex-
tent of ﬁnancial intermediationin these countries is comparable to developing rather than
industrialized countries. The theoretical part analyzes an overlapping generations model
with heterogenous entrepreneurial qualities and private information. A ﬁnancial collapse
can result, if young agents are too poor to provide enough collateral for ﬁnancing a small
project to prove their qualities as entrepreneur and no proven middle-aged entrepreneurs
are available who can be entrustedwith enoughfunds to run big projects. In that case, the
economycontractstoan agriculturalsteadystate. Possibleremediesare discussed. Inpar-
ticular, large inequality or a large-scale, long-lastinggovernment program of subsidizing
investment help to overcome the danger of a ﬁnancial collapse.1
1 Introduction
“The key barrier to a full-ﬂedgedmarketin Poland, and Central Europe in general,
is the lack of a banking and ﬁnancial system able to service investment-hungry
business.” (Therese Raphael, 1993)
“After decades of high but misdirected capital accumulation, there is now under-
investment. ... Domestic savings levels are substantial, but they are not being
channelled effectively into investment: budget deﬁcits swallow up a large part,
and domestic ﬁnancial intermediation cannot deal properly with the remainder.”
(Nuti and Portes, 1994)
Many countriesin Central Europearestill facedwith thedaunting task of shedding theirold
economic structure, which was left over by the shattering of the socialist system, and create a
new one in its place, vying to catch up economically to Western Europe. Most certainly, the
privatizationandthetask ofrestructuringthestate-ownedenterprises(SOEs) at theappropriate
speed is the major initial problem in all of these countries. Many of the other problems in
these countries are related. In particular, the task of restructuring affects the viability of the
intermediation sector, since bank balance sheets are loaded with bad loans to SOEs, thus
seriously distorting the incentives for the usual roles of banks in lending to and monitoring
enterprises (see e.g. Wijnbergen, 1994, and Aghion, Blanchard and Carlin, 1994). Many good
proposals to solve these immediate problems have been made.
In this paper we do not aim at adding to the discussion of these immediate tasks. Rather,
we worry about the future development in these countries and on the growth of the private
sector. Should weexpect these countriesto eventually function“normally”like,say, aWestern
European industrial states? Or might there be further problems down the road? This paper
focussesinparticularontheissueofﬁnancingnewlycreatedprivateenterprisesandargues,that
a ﬁnancial collapse might occur and that the vigor of the new entrepreneurs might disappear
again.
In the next section, the extent of ﬁnancial intermediation in the transition countries is
compared to other countries, using IMF data on claims on the private sector. We ﬁnd that the
extent of ﬁnancial intermediationin these countriesseems indeed dangerously low and (except
for Poland) does not grow rapidly. These countries tend to look more like, say, Zaire than, say,
the Netherlands in that respect.
In the following sections, the possibility for a ﬁnancial collapse is studied theoretically.
The idea is this. In an established market economy, one typically ﬁnds a pool of capable en-
trepreneurswho have proven their qualities when young by mainly self-ﬁnancing and building
up a small, but viable company. Funds allocated to these entrepreneurs enable them to build
these into large, successful companies and ultimately ensure a high wage level for the entire2
economy. If such a country is hit by a war and a large fraction of its capital stock is destroyed,
it is able to rebuild by lending resources to these entrepreneurs.
By contrast, countriesin transition do not have a stock of proven entrepreneurs. Since there
are no proven middle-aged entrepreneurs worth allocating funds to, the wage level remains
low and new young agents entering such an economy are too poor to self-ﬁnance a start-up
company. Lending to the young is prohibitively costly, given their limited collateral. Thus,
thereareno proven middle-aged entrepreneursseveral yearslater either. The ﬁnancial collapse
is perfect. The agency cost of intermediation have become too high to allow for a fruitful
allocation of resources to talented entrepreneurs.
This idea is formally demonstrated in a simple, highly stylized overlapping generations
model with heterogenous entrepreneurial qualities and asymmetric information. In section 3,
the model is built. In section 4, the steady states are analyzed. It will be shown, that there are
often at least two steady states: a fully industrialized one with many entrepreneursand another
agricultural one without entrepreneurs. In section 5, the dynamic transition process from an
initial state with rather low capital will be considered. For some parameter values, it will be
shown that with a pool of existing, proven entrepreneurs, the economy rebuilds to the capital-
rich steady state, while without them, the economy collapses to the low-capital agricultural
situation. In section 6, potential remedies are discussed, such as the creation of inequality,
international credit subsidies and joint ventures with foreigncompanies. We ﬁnd in particular,
that creating inequalitiesamong the young and / or long-termsubsidies to young entrepreneurs
provide for ways to achieve full industrialization most quickly. Section 7 concludes.
The idea of this paper rests on a potential lemon-problem in credit markets and therefore
is related in spirit to Akerlof (1970), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Mankiw (1986), Bester and
Hellwig (1987) and Gale (1992), although none of these models is used directly. Perhaps
most closely related is the work by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), who use a model with a
similar ﬂavor to ours to study propagation mechanisms of shocks in an economy characterized
by assymetric information about investment opportunities. However, aside from the different
focus, our paper also uses substantially different modelling choices. The breakdown of the
credit markets comes about due to a combination of adverse selection and the moral hazard
problem of misusing allocated funds. Interventions can be desirable, since they can help avoid
a credit market failure. This contrasts with e.g. Atkenson and Kehoe (1993), who consider
the recent decline of output in the transition countries as an optimal reallocation of managerial
talent to new technologies. The paper also contrasts with Aghion and Blanchard (1994), who
show that private job creation might be slowed down considerably, if unemployment and thus
the tax burden for ﬁnancing their beneﬁts becomes too high: while both papers argue that
problems might arise due to the small initial stock of private enterprises, the problems in the
paper by Aghion and Blanchard are due to taxation, whereas they are due to credit constraints3
here.
In its theme, the paper is related to the literature on ﬁnancial intermediation as an impor-
tant element in a well-functioning or growing market economy, i.e. to e.g. Jovanovic and
Greenwood (‘1990), Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Dewatripont and Maskin (1990), Aghion
and Bolton (1991a,b), Gilles Saint-Paul (1992), Gale (1992), Ciccone and Matsuyama (1993),
Galor and Zeira (1993) and Perotti (1994).
2 A look at the lack of ﬁnancial intermediation.
(Measured) output in the transition countries has fallen since the fall of the iron curtain, see
picture1. This should be cause of concern: rather than a quick improvement in these countries
dueto theeliminationof barrierstointernal trade, thesituationseems to have worsenedat least
initially. Will the fall continue? Will the situation improve? And how quickly? These are the
key questions of concern to economists, policy makers and the people living in these countries
alike.
One of the key determinants of success of failure in these countries after the privatization
issues have been put to rest is the establishment of a well-functioning credit market, where
aspiring, talented entrepreneurs receive the funding they need. To judge the progress the
transition countries have made one needs to measure how deep the ﬁnancial intermediation
sector has become. While there may be many ways to measure it, we pursue a rather rough
method here, which nonetheless leads to interesting comparisons and results. Series 32d in
the International Financial Statistics, published by the IMF, measures claims on the private
sector by thebanking sector, i.e. isa measureof total credit extended to privateindividualsand
businesses. Dividing it by the gross domestic product for the same year gives an indication of
the credit links established in an economy.
Picture 2 shows a plot of this private-credit-to-GDP ratio for a selected group of countries.
Three transition countriesare included: Pland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Sincethe datein
Picture 1 is 1990, we shouldn’t expect the new privatecredit links to reach very far: indeed, as
the picture shows, the private-credit-to-GDPratio in these transition countries hoovers around
10%, comparable to the level of Zambia, lower than the approximately 50% of Korea and
substantially lower than the more than 80% reached in established market economies such as
the Netherlands, Singapore, Germany or Japan.
A substantial improvement in thesenumberswould thereforebean indicationof a function-
ing credit market springing up in these countries. Pictures 3 through 5 therefore provide time
serieson thisratio forPoland,Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Whilethesituationimproved dra-
matically in Poland, the results look mixed for Czechoslovakia and discomforting in Hungary:
there, the private-credit-to-GDPratio actually fell in the subsequent two years.4
Will some of these countries in the end thereforelook more likeZaire than, say, the Nether-
lands? Should one even be concerned about these numbers? It seems, that only theoretical
arguments can shed further light on these issues: that is the purpose of the following sections.
We argue that ﬁnancial intermediation will be low if the agency costs due to asymmetric infor-
mation are high, and we argue that there actually is the danger of a ﬁnancial collapse, in which
all intermediation breaks down completely.
3 The Model.
3.1 The Environment.
In each period t = 0, 1, 2 ..., a new generation of agents i 2 [0;1] is born. These agents live
three periods and care about the sum of their total consumption, u = cy + cm + co,w h e r e
c y;c m;c o 0. Upon birth, a parameter γi  0 characterizing entrepreneurial talent is drawn
privately for agent i according to some continuous probability distribution G on I R+ with
E[γi] < 1 and G(0) = 0. The draws are independent across agents and time. Agents are
endowed with one unit of time, when young, which they supply inelastically as labor. Agents
are also endowed with a small amount ot the consumption good ca  0 each period, which
we interpret as consumption generated by some agricultural or “low-tech” technology always
available to the agent. At t =0 , there also is a middle-aged generation, living for one more
period, and an old generation living only in period t =0 , who again care about their total
life-time consumption.




where 0 <<2 = 3and  k denotes the aggregate capital stock. This externality-expanded
Cobb-Douglas production function has become popular in the endogenous growth literature
(e.g. Romer (1986) or Uhlig and Yanagawa (1992)), since it helps in accounting for the
stylized fact that capital returns are roughly the same everywhere, but wages are much higher
in capital-rich countries(see the discussion in Lucas, 1990). For the model here, it also greatly
simpliﬁes the algebra.
Capital for the next period can be produced in two ways. First, young agents can become
entrepreneurs and invest resources x = xs in form of the ﬁnal good in a “small” project of
ﬁxed size xs >c a. If they do, they receive
k = γixs (2)
units of capital next period. In that period, k and thus γi become public information. Given
resources xs, however, a young agent also has the option of just pretending to invest. Un-5
observed by anybody in that period except himself or herself, he or she receives utility xs.
That no capital is created is public information next period, while γi remains private. The
parameter 0    1 measures the ease with which funds can be misallocated: at  =1 ,t h e
fake entrepreneur simply consumes the available resources, whereas at  =0it is impossible
to escape the watchfuleyes of thelenders and deriveany use from thefunds other than through
genuine investment.
Secondly, middle-aged agents can invest resources x = xb >x sin a “big” project and
receive
k = γixb (3)
units of capital, when old. For simplicity, it is assumed that they cannot pretend to invest.
Capital depreciates completely at the end of a period.
3.2 Equilibrium.
We consider the following competitive equilibrium. The production technology for the ﬁnal
output is operated by a competitive industry of ﬁrms, buying the capital from the capital
owners at a unit price q for that period and hiring labor at a unit price w. The production of
the investment good is undertaken, taking the market price for a unit of capital next period as
given.
There is free entry into the banking industry. Debt contracts lasting one period with the
possibility for default are the only type of contracts offered1. We furthermore assume that ca
cannot be contracted upon, i.e. an agent cannot promise to surrender futureca upon defaulting
on a bank loan. Banks choose loan size, interest rates and total credit supplied. Contracts
offered to the young demand an interest factor (i.e. 1 + interest rate / 100) of R whereas the
interest factor for the middle-aged is denoted by Rm. Contracts can be enforced subject to
the constraint that consumption must be nonnegative. A competitive equilibrium is a list of
consumption choices, investments/ faking decisions for all agents and all periods, and capital
prices, wages and interest rates for all periods, so that all markets clear except the market for
savings (see below), so that all agents maximize their utility (concerning the technical issue of
aggregating a continuum of random variables as is necessary when spelling out the deﬁnition
of an equilibrium formally, see Uhlig (1987)).
In equilibria, in which some middle aged agents consume positive amounts, the expected
return on any asset must be unity. In particular, Rm =1 . Occasionally, candidate equilibria
with a safe interest rate of zero result in total investment exceeding maximal total savings.
We will nonetheless restrict attention to this interest rate and these equilibria throughout,
interpreting the extra borrowing needed to come from credit extended by foreign countries.
1In particular, we exclude lotteries, see subsection 6.1.6
Thus, an expected return of unity condition for lenders replaces the market clearing condition
for savings.
In all competitive equilibria, proﬁt maximization of the competitive output-producing in-
dustry and aggregation imply, that q =  and w =( 1− )  k .
3.3 Credit Markets.
Consider now a period with wages w and an interest factor R charged to young would-be
entrepreneurs. Suppose furthermorethat an entrepreneur who has taken the investment hurdle
whenyoungisalwaysabletoreceivecreditforoperatingthebiginvestmentprojectataninterest
factor of unity: this assumption will be justiﬁed in equilibrium, since only the high-quality
entrepreneurs will invest when young.
If w + ca  xs, a young agent will receive lifetime utility (γi − 1)(xs + xb)+w+3 c a
from investing and will therefore choose to do so if γi  1.
If w<x s−c a , the agent can either enjoy lifetime utility w +3 c a from his wages and
endowmentsor attempt to borrowfunds xs−w−ca froma bank. Given resourcesxs, a young
agent thus faces the following tradeoff. He or she can either fake to be an investor and receive
total lifetime utility xs +2 c a. Or he or she can genuinly undertake the project and receive
total life time utility γi(xs + xb) − R(xs − w − ca) − xb +2 c a. The third possibility to only
invest when young is dominated by these two alternatives and can thus be ignored from now
on, since it will turn out that R  1, see equation (5).
Ifxs <w+c a, a completeseparation takes place atR =1 : all young agents withγi  1
will request funds and genuinly invest, whereas all others will not request funds and consume
or save their wages. For xs >w+c a, all agents will borrow funds. An agent will genuinly
invest, iff














All other young agents will instead pretend to invest.
Attention is now restricted to the case  =1 . Other values are considered again only in
subsection 6.5. Banks compete by setting interest rates. If a bank offers an interest rate lower
than its competitors, all agents with highγi will apply for a loan at this bank. Likewise, agents
withalowγ willapplythereinordernot torevealthattheyaredifferentfromthehigh-γ agents.
We thus assume, that genuine investors and fakeinvestors are alwaysin ﬁxed proportionin the
applicant pool of a bank with that proportiondepending on the equilibrium fraction of genuine
entrepreneurs, provided fake investors are indifferent between the different contracts offered
and weakly preferthem to not applying for a loan at all. Sincethe expected return on thefunds7
lent by a bank must equal unity in equilibrium, the equilibrium interest factorR  0 satisﬁes2
R(1 − G(γR;w)) = 1 (5)
Clearly, any solution R to this equationsatisﬁes R  1. In general, there can be zero, one, two
or more solutions. The left-hand side of (5) converges to 0 as R ! 0 and as R !1 , since it
is bounded by the tail of a ﬁnite integral,






γG(dγ)=E [ γ ]<1 : (6)
Thus, there will be an even number of solutions generically in w, see ﬁgure 1. If there is at
least one solution, the smallest of all solutions must be the equilibrium interest factor (this
argument is similar to the one in Mankiw (1986)): consider any other solution ~ R. Generically
in w, one can then ﬁnd some ^ R<~ R , so that ^ R(1 − G(γ ^ R;w)) > 1. A bank charging ^ R could
therefore make a proﬁt, a contradiction to free entry into banking. The argument fails only, if
the function R(1 − G(γR;w)) in ﬁgure 1 touches the line at unity at the lowest solution to (5)
without exceeding it.
For w<x s−c a,l e tΨ(w)  R be that smallest solution to (5), if it exists, and Ψ(w)=1 ,
if not. It is easy to check, that if thereisa solution forsome w, then theremust be asolution for
any ~ w>w ,~ w<x s−c aas well. Thus, let w  minfw  0 j Ψ(w) < 1g or, equivalently,
w
 =m a xf 0;x s−c a−(x s+x b)M G;g; (7)
where MG; =m a x γ  0( γ − 1)(1 − G(γ)). The function Ψ is decreasing, but not necessarily
continuouson [w;x s). A sufﬁcient condition for continuity is that (γ−1)(1−G(γ)) strictly
increases for γ  0 until reaching MG;.L e tΨ(w)=1for w  xs.D e ﬁ n eR =Ψ ( w ) .
As for γ,l e tΓ(w)  γΨ(w);w for w<x s−c aand Γ(w)=1 = for w  xs − ca.D e ﬁ n e
γ =Γ ( w ) . Thus, in any given period with prevailing wages w, all projects with γi  Γ(w)
are undertaken by the young. In particular, if wages w and thus the collateral offered by
young agents fall below the critical bound w, there will be no young entrepreneurs and
thereforeno successful middle-agedentrepreneursnext period. Thecredit marketbrakesdown
Akerlof-style (see Akerlof (1970)): raising the interest rate just results in worsening the pool
of applicants and the expected return never exceeds the market interest rate on safe assets.
Figure2showsa plotof thesefunctions,takingasexampletheexponential distributionwith














2For the mathematical analysis, it is more convenient to rewrite (5) as
xs + xb
xs − w − ca
(γ − 1)(1 − G(γ)) = 1:
A solution to this equation delivers γR;w = γ rather than R.8
ThefunctiononthelefthandsideofthisequationhasauniquemaximumatR = exp(1+=)
and equals zero at R =e x p ( =). In between, it is strictly monotonously increasing and Ψ(w)
for w<x ais the inverse of this piece applied to the right hand side of (8). Furthermore,
w
 =m a x







Γ(w)=1 = log(Ψ(w)) for w<x sand γ =1 = +1 =. The speciﬁc parameter choices for
ﬁgure 2 are ca =0 ,=: 3 ,x s=1 ,x b=4and  = :3, so that w =0 : 32.
4 Steady State Analyis.
4.1 The Perfect Information Benchmark.
As a benchmark, consider ﬁrst a variant of the economy described above, in which all γi are
public rather than private information. In the competitive steady state equilibrium, R =1and
all projects with γi  1 are funded. The aggregate capital stock is given by




=( x s + x b )(1 − G(1=))E[γ j γ  1=] (11)
aggregate output is  y =  k, aggregate investment is
 x =( x s+x b)(1 − G(1=)) (12)
and aggregate and thus average lifetime consumption is  y −  x +3 c a.
To provide funds sufﬁcient for justifying a market interest factor of unity without the
reliance on foreign creditors, maximal total savings need to exceed aggregate investment.
Since maximal total savings are given by the sum of funds available to the young and to the
middle aged,
smax =3 c a +2 w+x s
Z
1 =
(γ − 1)G(dγ) (13)
 3ca +2 ( 1− ) k (14)
with  k given in equation (10), the constraint  x  smax is satisﬁed, since   2=3 and thus
2(1−)E[γ j γ  1=]  1. In other words,no borrowingfrom foreigncountriesis necessary
to support this equilbrium.
It is instructive to calculate the social planners steady state solution as well. Maximizing
average welfare or average life time consumption subject to feasibility, i.e. maximizing
 c =3 c a+( x s+x b)
Z 1
γsp
(γ − 1)G(dγ) (15)9
over γsp yields γsp =1 . The underinvestment in the competitive equilibrium compared to
this social planners solution is, of course, a result of the externality in the production in ﬁnal
output.
4.2 Steady States in The Asymmetric Information Economy.
There are three types of candidate steady states. The ﬁrst is a fully industrialized steady
state with w  xs − ca, in which all young entrepreneurs can ﬁnance their project out of
their own funds, if they wish to do so. The second is a partially industrialized steady state
with w  w<x s−c a , in which all young agents obtain a credit from a bank, but just a
fraction turns it into a valuable investment. Finally, there can be an agricultural steady state
with 0=w<w  , no capital and without entrepreneurs, in which ca is the only source of
consumption.
The fully industrialized steady state equals the competitive equilibrium in the benchmark,
full-informationeconomy. It exists, if




It sufﬁces to check this condition with ca replaced by zero. For the exponential distribution














exp(−=)  1: (17)
This condition is satisﬁed for example for the parameters used to draw ﬁgure 2.
In a partially industrialized steady state with unity as the safe factor of return, all young
agents are credit ﬁnanced. To check existence of a partially industrialized steady state, ﬁnd a
γp equal to the right hand side of equation (4) with w replaced by the equilibrium wage on the
right hand side of equation (16) and R replaced by (1 − G(γp))−1 according to equation (5).
One obtains as a necessary condition for existence of a partially industrialized steady state the
















To simplify (18),note that the right hand side of (18) converges to 1 as γp !1 .F o rγ p!0 ,




− (1 − )E[γ]+1 : (19)
IfGiscontinuous,  0isasufﬁcientconditionforthenecessarycondition(18). Replacingca










as a sufﬁcient condition for the necessary condition (18). This condition is satisﬁed for the
parameters chosen to draw ﬁgure 2.
To check that a solution to (18) indeed delivers a partially industrialized steady state
equilibrium with borrowing from foreign countries at a safe factor of unity, one needs to check
that R =( 1−G ( γ p))−1 is not just a solution to (5), but the smallest one, given the equilibrium
wage w.
There can also be periodic equilibria. One possibility is that wt = w(1) >x s−c ain all
even periods t and wt = w(2) <w in all odd periods. Such an equilibrium exists, if
w
(1) =( 1− ) x b
Z 1
1 =
γG(dγ) >x s−c a; (21)
and
w





a condition easy to satisfy with appropriate choices for xs and xb. In such an equilibrium,
young entrepreneurs arise only every second period, when the wage-level due to the capital
generated by investment into big projects is high enough for a self-ﬁnanced start-up.
5 Dynamic Transition.
5.1 Dynamic Equilibria and Financial Collapse.
Therearetwostatevariablesateachdatet: aggregatecapital kt andmiddle-agedentrepreneurial
talent,characterizedbythetalentlevel γt,abovewhichallyoungentrepreneurshaveundertaken
their project in the previous period.
Calculate wages wt =( 1− )  k t .I f w t<w  , no young entrepreneurs will operate their
project and  γt+1 = 1.I f w  w t<x s−c a , all young agents receive funding at interest
factor R =Ψ ( w t ) , but only those with γi   γt+1  Γ(wt) actually undertake their project,
whereas all others consume the borrowed funds. Finally, if wt  xs − ca, young agents can
self-ﬁnance the small project, if they care to, and all young agents with γi   γt+1  1= will
do so. In short,
 γt+1 = Γ((1 − )kt): (23)
Since all middle aged entrepreneurs are funded to run the big project (provided,γi  1=),
capital next period is given by







Aﬁnancial collapseresults ifno young entrepreneurﬁndsfundstooperatehisor her project
for all periods t  t. The economy then collapses to the agricultural steady state in a few
periods. For t =0 , this occurs iff (1 − ) k0 <w and (1 − ) k1 <w  . Given no young
entrepreneurs in period 0, capital in period 1 is the result only of the investment by middle
aged entrepreneurs in period 0. Given an initial level of capital  k0 and a pool of middle-aged












The transition equations can be understood in the state space diagram given in ﬁgure 3A.
While one curve shows the relationship between current capital and the new entrepreneurial
cut-off point,  γ = Γ((1 − ) k), the other line shows the relationship between γ = γt = γt+1
and k given by




The intersection of these two lines give the steady states: there are two “stable” ones. Also
included are the dynamic transitions from several points within the state diagram to the next:
the “+” indicates the current state, whereas the end of the line starting at a “+” indicates the
state in the next period. One can see, how the fully industrialized steady states acts as an
attractor for at least some regions of the state space. However, if the initial capital is too low,
the economy collapses: the cut-off talent reaches inﬁnity in one step, and may remain there, if
capital remains too low as well.
Some examples of transition paths in time series format are shown in ﬁgures 4 through 7.
The same parameters as for ﬁgure 2 are used except that  = :7. Figure 4 and ﬁgure 6 contain
ten sample transition path for different initial states ( k0;  γ0). In ﬁgure 4 and 5, only the initial
capital level and in ﬁgure 6 and 7, only the pool of available middle aged entrepreneurs has
been varied. The parameters for both ﬁgures are the same as in ﬁgure 2, except that  = :5
in ﬁgure 4 and  = :7 in ﬁgure 6. In ﬁgure 4,  γ0 =4 = and  k0 2 [:8;1:6]. In ﬁgure 6,
 γ0 2 [4:3;5:3] and  k0 =1 : 33, cmp. ﬁgure 4. Note how some of the transition path collapse
to the agricultural steady state, some build up to the fully industrialized steady state whereas
others settle on a limiting periodic equilibrium with periodicity 2 (we have not checked these
convergence claims formally, but they seem obvious).
As is clear from the analysis above as well as in particular from ﬁgure 6, it is not just the
initiallevelofcapital,whichdeterminesthefateofacountry,butthepoolofsuccessful,middle-
aged entrepreneurs as well. Even though an established market economy after a war may start
(or has started) from the same initial capital stock as a country in transition from socialism,12
the established market economy may be able to rebuild to the fully industrialized steady state
due to its available pool of successful middle-aged entrepreneurs, whereas a transition country
may collapse to the agricultural steady state due to the lack of these entrepreneurs.
6 Remedies.
6.1 Richer Contracts and Market Solutions.
Part of thethreat of theﬁnancial collapsemay bedueto the restrictitionto debt contracts. Thus
consider lotteries and equity contracts.
Since agents are risk-neutral, they cannot loose entering a lottery with their wages and
endowmentw+ca, where they either receivexs with probability(w+ca)=xs or receive 0 with
probability 1− (w +ca)=xs. Winning agents will proceed to invest in their project if γi  1.
Alternatively, suppose that an (arbitrarily) small fee needs to be charged to anybody entering
a lottery (either due to a government tax or to a resource input requirement to run the lottery).
Agents will then self-select and only those with γi slightly bigger than 1 will participate. In
either case, in addition to the two state variables  kt and  γt, there is a third state variable  t
equal to the probability of winning the lottery, provided γi > 1. Given the state ( kt;  γt;  t),
calculate wages wt =( 1− )  k t.F i n d γ t +1 =1 =,  t+1 =( w t+c a) =xs and
 kt+1 = ka + xs t+1
Z 1
 γt+1




Figure8 shows a sample path for an economy with and without lotteries. The same parameters
as for ﬁgure 2 are used except that  = :5. Starting values are  k0 =1 : 0 , γ 0 =3 = and
 0 =1 : 0 . Note, how the economy with lotteries avoids the ﬁnancial collapse, whereas the
economy without lotteries falls into it. In practice, such lotteries could be provided privately
through legalized gambling. Although beyond the analysis here, it should be evident that a
policy recommendation based on gambling on a large scale as a way to jump-start transition
economies is probably hard to sell, even if economically desirable.
Equity contracts make repayments on funds allocated to the young conditional on the
realized quality of the project in the next period. For example, suppose all banks just offered
one type of contract, in which agents pay “dividends” according to the schedule
d(γ)=maxf0;(γ − 1)(xa + xb)g (28)
for some parameter 0 <<1 . With w<x s−c a, all young agents will borrow funds from
the bank. Those with γi  1 invest, whereas all others eat the funds allocated to them. If
these dividend contracts are the only contracts offered, free entry into banking implies that in
equilibrium
1= =( x s+x b)
Z 1
1 =
(γ − 1)G(dγ); (29)13
provided the right hand side of this equation exceeds unity. For the exponential distribution
example, the right hand side of (29) equals (xa + xb)= and thus exceeds unity for example
for the parameters used to draw ﬁgure 2. Investment is as efﬁcient as the full-information
competitive equilibrium and a ﬁnancial collapse cannot result.
However, equity contracts as above do not seem to be the “golden way out”, if banks are
allowed to offer any kind of contract and not just the contract described above. The contract
above as well as the debt contract used in the previous sections work since the losses to the
fake entrepreneurs are covered with the returns from genuine investors. Without restrictions
on the design of non-randomized contracts, however, a deviating bank can give high-value
entrepreneurswithγi 2 [~ γ−;~ γ+]forsome ~ γ>1 = and somesmall>0 , say, abetterdeal
by lowering the parameter  for that group, for example, attracting these entrepreneurs away
from other banks by self-selection. Any new genuine entrepreneur attracted due to a “sweat
deal” brings along a ﬁxed proportion of fake entrepreneurs, since fake entrepreneurs mimick
genuine entrepreneurs by assumption (cmp. section 3.3). It follows that in equilibrium, every
genuine investor must contribute the same amount to cover the losses resulting from the fake
entrepreneurs. In other words, without restrictions on the design of non-randomized contracts
and free entry into banking, the contracts offered by banks must be debt contracts, as assumed
in the preceeding sections.
Hence if equity contracts shall help to avoid a ﬁnancial collapse, then restrictions on the
type of contracts that banks can offer need to be imposed. By contrast, only lotteries need to
be ruled out for debt contracts as analyzed in the previous sections to emerge endogeneously.
In other words, requiring by law that ﬁnancing of investment projects of the young must be
done with equity contracts of the type described above and allowing competition only in the
parameter mayindeed beawayforatransitioncountryto avoidaﬁnancialcollapse. Practical
ways in which this may be accomplished at least approximately are subsidized venture capital
funds (see subsection 6.3) or joint ventures with foreign investors (see subsection 6.5).
Iflendersareallowed toenterrandomizedcontracts, probablylotteriesofthetypedescribed
above are the only contracts that survive competition.
6.2 Creating Inequality.
As shown above, lotteries can help in avoiding a ﬁnancial collapse. Aside from legalized
gambling, redistributions that create inequalities among the young accidentally or by design
can be ways to institute such lotteries. One can observe in the transition countries, that
governmental programsresult inan unequal distributionof theownershipin the initial stock of
capitalandhousingamongtheyoung. Likewise,differentialaccesstomarketopportunitiesand
arbitrage opportunities before the establishment of solid property rights seem to have resulted
in the emergence of a fewafﬂuent, young “proﬁteers”in these countries. Some of these agents14
may be entrepreneurially talented and will turn their wealth into start-up funds for a viable
company.
Another possibility is to redistribute wealth from the middle-aged and old to the young,
i.e. to create intergenerational redistributions. The point is to raise the funds available to the
young from w =( 1− )  k+c ato ~ w =  k +ca, the maximal, feasible level. This is particularly
effective, if, say, w<w and ~ w  xs, so that rather than having too little collateral for starting
a company when young, young agents are made sufﬁciently wealthy to start such a company
out of their own funds. Such an intergenerational redistribution can take the form of wage
subsidies or a distribution of the initial property rights in the ownership of capital in favor of
the young. The political difﬁculties of generating inequality should be evident, but is beyond
the analysis of this paper.
6.3 Subsidizing Investment.
There are a variety of schemes to subsidize investment which can be analyzed within this
framework. Basically, a government can offer any of the contracts discussed above without
the zero proﬁt constraint, ﬁnancing the shortfall via taxation or debt. The effects of such a
policy depend among other things on the type of contract offered, on the competition allowed
by private intermediaries and on the tax schedule.
Consider providing the entire difference between w + ca and xs free to all young agents.
Suppose this is ﬁnanced by issuing debt to be retired in the next period via a lump-sum tax
on income in excess of ca of middle-aged agents. Since middle-aged agents have income in
excess ofca onlyif they genuinlyinvested, they will only do so if their investmentsyields more
than they have to pay in taxes. In other words, the same tradeoff and the same equilibrium as
in the debt-contract case discussed in the previous sections emerges.
Suppose instead that the debt is not immediately retired in the next period. Speciﬁcally, let
 w be the wage in the fully industrialized steady state and suppose that    w + ca − xs > 0.
If the government provides xs − w − ca to all young agents for two periods and then collects
lump-sum taxes  of young agents in subsequent periods until the debt is retired, the economy
jumps to the fully industrialized steady state within two periods and remains there. In other
words, subsidizing young entrepreneurs for two periods (read “fourty years”, if the average
agent is thought to live for sixty years) and not restarting repaying the debt during that phase
is probably the fastest feasible way to jump-start the economy. Slower but cheaper ways
involve similarly ﬁnancing not all but just a fraction of the young would-be entrepreneurs.
Repayment of the debt should then be pushed even further into the future if adverse effects on
the emergence of young entrepreneurs are to be avoided.
Another scheme one may wish to consider is a government- subsidized venture capital
funds with dividend-schedules as in equation (28). We assume that there are private banks as15
well, offering debt contracts to young agents at some interest factor R. Since in equilibrium,
all agents with γi  1 will genuinly invest and since therefore the constant fraction G(1=)
of all applicants to an intermediary are genuine entrepreneurs, the equilibrium interest factor
is given by R =1 =G(1=). In particular, the operation of a venture capital fund rules out a










(cmp. also to equation (4)). All agents withγi < 1 will be fakeentrepreneurs, all agents with
1=  γi <γ will self-select to the government-run venture capital fund and all agents with
γi  γ will prefer the debt contract. The expected return to the venture capital fund is given
by
v = G(1=)(xs + xb)
Z γ
1=
(γ − 1)G(dγ): (31)
Note that v<1for all , since the equity-contract returns less than the debt-contract and
the debt contract returns unity in equilibrium. The shortfall needs to be ﬁnanced by debt or




(1 − exp(−=))(exp(−=) − exp(−γ))(xs + xb) − exp(−γ)(xs − w); (32)
which has been plotted in ﬁgure 9 for the parameters used for ﬁgure 2 at w = w.
6.4 Foreign Aid.
Abenevolentforeigncountrycan aid atransitioncountryin avoidingaﬁnancialcollapse, using
any of the instruments described above. The discussion only differsin that revenues needed to
ﬁnance such programs need not be raised by taxation or debt within the country under study.
Most promising seems to be to endow a fraction of the young agents via a lump-sum transfer
with enough resources (i.e. withxs−w), so that they can start their own company, if they wish
to do so. Only the fractionG(1=) of these transferredfunds will result in genuine investment,
the rest will be consumed or wasted immediately. This may make it hard politically to argue
in favor of such a program in the donating country.
6.5 Joint Ventures.
Jointventuresbetween anentrepreneurfromanestablished marketeconomyand somedesolate
ﬁrm in a country in transition were initially often promoted in the public debate to jump-start
capitalism in these countries. In considering the advantages and disadvantages, it needs to be
carefully clariﬁed, what it is, that a joint venture can provide, that a bank or a government16
cannot and vice versa. While some possibilities are offered below, the additional assumptions
necessary need to be carefully checked in practice.
Within the model here, a joint venture may be either thought of as a project owned by
one of the young agents in the transition country and jointly operated by both partners of the
joint venture or as a project of a successful middle aged entrepreneur of the foreign country,
undertaken in the transition country rather than the home country. The latter is simply foreign
direct investment with positive effects on the overall wage level, since it increases the capital
availablein the transitioncountry. For theformer,one may want to assume, that a jointventure
offers one of the following advantages as compared to a bank loan:
 A joint venture may take the form of an equity-contract due to some restriction imposed
on the type of allowable joint venture contracts by the government of the transition
country or by the laws of the foreign country (see the discussion in subsection 6.1).
Thus, such a joint venture plays essentially the same role as the venture capital funds
described in subsection 6.3.
 The foreign ﬁrm may have expertise in evaluating projects that banks do not: in the
extreme, the foreign ﬁrm can costlessly observe the value γi of the young agent to
be contracted. Investment for these projects will be the same as in the competitive,
full-informationbenchmark economy.
 The foreign ﬁrm may be better in monitoring the investment than a bank. Within the
model here, this can be modelled by assuming some value for  smaller than unity for
young agents in a joint venture. The lower , the lower γR;w, see equation (4) and
the lower the interest factor the foreign company needs to charge its domestic partner
in order to receive an expected return of unity. In fact, if monitoring is so good that
<( w+c a) =xs, monitoring becomes perfect due to self-selection: if the foreign ﬁrm
demands an interest factorR =1on itsinvestment in thejoint venture, only those young
entrepreneurs with γi  1 will accept.
Presumably, joint ventures may also offer beneﬁts beyond those under consideration in the
model of this paper. For example, a joint venture may result in a transfer of know-how, which
are of use to other entrepreneurs due to some spill-over effect. In practice, joint ventures may
have been simply attempts at getting around ill-deﬁned property rights with murky beneﬁts.
Further study of this issue is clearly warranted.
7 Conclusions.
It was shown that countries starting from a low level of initial capital as well as a low level
of proven entrepreneurial talent such as countries in transition from socialism to capitalism17
may ﬁnd themselves in ﬁnancial collapse. In this case, young wage-earning agents have too
little collateral in order to assure themselves credit for operating a small start-up company
and thus for proving their entrepreneurial talent. As a result, there are no proven middle
aged entrepreneurs around later on to build larger enterprises and pay decent wages. Once in
collapse, theeconomy contractsover timeto an agriculturalsteady statewithout entrepreneurs.
Different remedies have been considered. Most potent seems to be either to government-
subsidize young entrepreneurs for an extended period such as fourty years, repaying the debt
after the economy has achieved the fully-industrialized steady state, or to create inequalities
among the young, so that a fraction of the young agents ﬁnd it feasible to start up a company
out of their own funds. Related alternatives such as legalized gambling, venture capital
funds, subsidized investment, subsidized wages, intergenerational redistributions, subsidies
fromabroadandjointventureshavebeendiscussed. Weconcludethatthecollapseisdangerous,
but avoidable, if correct policy measures are undertaken.18
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